

The Impact of Immigration Policies on Local Enforcement, Crime and Policing Efficiency *

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Abstract

Following a period of increasing immigration enforcement under George W. Bush's administration, the Obama administration reversed immigration policies and issued strict new guidelines to relax enforcement in 2011. The purpose of this paper is to exploit this natural experiment in the enforcement of the immigration laws to study the effects of federal immigration policies on local enforcement, crime and policing efficiency. I use a unique and new data set obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request on several steps of the deportation process. I estimate how the drop in federal immigration enforcement affected county level enforcement, local crime rates and policing efficiency. My empirical analysis suggests that Democratic counties complemented federal policies, by reducing their immigration enforcement, whereas Republican counties tended to maintain higher levels of enforcement and to not react much to the guidelines. Employing a triple-difference approach, I find that Democratic counties with higher non-citizen population shares saw greater increases in clearance rates, a measure of policing efficiency, with no increase in crime rates. The results indicate that reducing immigration enforcement did not increase crime and rather led to an increase in policing efficiency, either because it allowed police to focus efforts on solving more serious crimes or because it elicited greater cooperation of non-citizens with police.

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“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best ... They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.”

Donald Trump, June 16, 2015

1 Introduction

Immigration policy is at the center of the political debate in the United States and in many European countries. In the 2016 US Presidential campaign, President-elect Donald Trump proposed strong measures to stem the flow of immigrants and to reduce the size of the undocumented population. He proposed building a wall on the southern border with Mexico, drastically increasing the number of deportations and reducing the undocumented population’s access to employment and welfare benefits. In contrast, the Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton was in favor of a path to citizenship for the undocumented and supported excluding some categories of the undocumented from deportation.

One of the reasons for the policy debate’s focus on immigration is the presumed relationship between immigration and crime. Those in favor of strong immigration enforcement argue that immigrants commit many crimes and believe that removing criminal aliens should be a top priority. Those favoring a more lenient approach believe that immigration enforcement is actually counterproductive, because it distracts law enforcement resources from fighting more serious crimes and makes immigrants less likely to collaborate with the police.

At the local level, different beliefs regarding the relationship between immigration and crime or different political preferences for immigration generate variation in the local intensity of enforcement of immigration laws. In the US, self-declared sanctuary cities such as San Francisco protect undocumented immigrants from deportation and guarantee limited access to health care and to various city services. By contrast, Sheriff Arpaio of Maricopa County, Arizona has gained notoriety for his workplace immigration raids. Local actions can create tensions with the federal government and limit its capacity in implementing the preferred

policy.¹

The goal of this paper is to assess the effect of federal immigration policies on local enforcement, crime and policing efficiency. As a source of exogenous variation in immigration enforcement, I use a 2011 policy change that drastically reduced non-border deportations in the US. Non-border deportations typically start with an arrest by a local police officer. Officers of the federal immigration agency, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), can then communicate to the local enforcement agency that they want to take the arrestee into custody by issuing a so-called detainer. At this point, pending collaboration by the enforcement agency in charge of jails, usually the Sheriff's office at the county level, the arrestee can expediently be transferred to ICE custody and later deported.

Following a period of increasing immigration enforcement under George W. Bush's administration, the trend was reversed when, in 2011, the Obama administration issued guidelines to relax enforcement. This was done partly to appeal to Hispanic voters in the run-up to his re-election campaign. These guidelines prioritized deportations to individuals representing an imminent threat to the country. The number of removals from the interior of the US peaked in 2010-2011 and then decreased to around 30% of their 2010 level by the end of 2015. Some counties went further in this direction, with some county councils passing "no detainer" ordinances designed to limit collaboration with ICE. In practice, this meant ordering the sheriff to stop handing over detainees to the federal authorities for deportation, except for those accused of serious crimes.

In this paper, I evaluate the effects of the dramatic change in immigration policy that occurred under the Obama administration in 2011 on county-level immigration enforcement, crime and policing efficiency. I use a difference-in-difference and a triple difference methodology that exploits county characteristics to determine which counties are most affected by the policy change. Through a Freedom of Information Act request, I obtained unique data gathered under the Secure Communities program for the period 2008 to 2014. Under this program, fingerprints of arrestees that are usually sent to the FBI are also shared with ICE.

¹For example, several bills have been proposed in Congress to defund sanctuary cities. In the opposite direction, in May 2012, the Justice Department under the Obama Administration sued Sheriff Joe Arpaio for racial profiling.

The ICE can then cross-reference information in their immigration database and detect potential immigration violators. The monthly data include deportations at the county level along with information on several steps of the deportation process, from the arrest by the local enforcement agency to the final removal. Secure Communities data are particularly useful because they enable construction of a continuous and uniform measure of enforcement, namely the share of non-citizens arrested that end up in custody of the federal immigration agency, for multiple jurisdictions over time. As described below, I decompose this enforcement measure into components due to local and federal enforcement. In particular, I measure federal enforcement using the issuance of detainers while I measure local enforcement using the share of detainers that end up in ICE arrests. I supplement these data with monthly crime and clearance rates from the FBI's Uniform Crime Report and with county characteristics from the Census and the American Community Survey. I aggregate all data in quarters. The merged dataset permits examination of the effects of immigration enforcement on crime and on clearance rates (the number of crimes cleared by an arrest), a standard measure of policing efficiency in the criminology literature.

I first document changes over time in county level enforcement and explore how enforcement relates to county characteristics. Both federal and local enforcement drop significantly after the Obama guidelines were issued. However, counties may have reacted very differently depending on county preferences for immigration. My empirical analysis finds that Democratic counties complemented federal policies, by reducing their immigration enforcement, whereas Republican counties tended to maintain higher levels of enforcement and to not react much to the guidelines.

To analyze the effects on crime and policing, I first use a difference-in-difference approach comparing counties with different percentages of non-citizens before and after the change in policy. I use the non-citizen share of the population as a proxy measure for the potential impact of the policy change with the idea that the policy should have no effect on crime and policing outcomes in places with very few immigrants (e.g., Montana), but potentially strong effects in places with a large immigrant community (e.g., Los Angeles). I find that the

relaxation in immigration enforcement in 2011 had no effect on crime levels or crime rates but had a small positive effect on clearance rates. A one standard deviation increase in non-citizen share increases clearance rates for violent crimes by nearly 1%. This analysis, however, does not take into account how county-level characteristics, such as the share of Democrat voters, influence the level of enforcement. Employing a triple-difference framework, I find that counties with higher non-citizen population shares in more Democratic counties saw greater increases in clearance rates, my measure of policing efficiency, but experienced no significant change in crime. I find that for a one standard deviation increase in non-citizen share, moving a county from the lowest to the highest Democratic share would increase the clearance rate for violent crimes by 3.5%, approximately 6.1% percent of the average clearance rate for violent crimes (57.1 percent).

The identification assumption for the triple-difference analysis is that for a given increase in non-citizen share, there would have not been a differential change in trend between Democrat and Republican counties without the Obama guidelines. Implementing an event study around the policy change, I provide evidence in favor of the parallel trend assumption by showing that, for a given increase in non-citizen share, the Democratic share does not predict differential clearance rates before the guidelines were issued.

I examine robustness of the results to a number of factors, including changes in economic conditions, changes in the size of the police department, other changes in immigration enforcement at the state or local level, and different ways of subsampling the data to create a common support between the treatment and control groups. Finally, I supplement the analysis of the federal policy change by examining the effects of the California Trust Act, implemented in January 2014. This state law forced California counties to limit their collaboration with the federal immigration agency only to serious crimes. With a triple difference analysis, I find that, similar to the Obama guidelines, the Trust Act increased clearances and had no effect on crime. Following implementation, a one standard deviation increase in the non citizen share in California counties raises the clearance rate by 3.9 percentage points relative to unaffected states.

This paper has two key findings. First, I show that tougher immigration enforcement does not reduce crime and appears instead to make the job of the local police harder, as reflected in lower clearance rates. Second, this paper explores how political considerations affect the implementation of immigration policy, and shows that policy effects can be heterogeneous depending on county characteristics. The results underscore the importance of taking into account how local authorities will react to federal policies in determining overall enforcement levels and the policies impact on county level outcomes. In particular, when local and federal preferences are aligned, the effect of federal policies is stronger.

The relationship between immigration and crime is gaining attention in the literature, although empirical evidence to date is still scant. Looking at Italian provinces, [Bianchi et al. \[2012\]](#) find no significant impact of immigration on overall crime rates except for an increase in the incidence of robberies. [Bell et al. \[2013\]](#) find a positive effect of immigration on property crime rates when looking at asylum seekers but no effect when considering the inflow of workers in 2004 from the rest of the EU to the UK. [Pinotti \[2014\]](#) uses a regression discontinuity design to show that legal status has an important impact on committing crimes. The most closely related paper is [Miles and Cox \[2014\]](#), which analyzes the effects of the activation of the Secure Communities program on crime rates with part of the data used in this paper. After controlling for county-specific linear time trends, they do not find any significant effect of Secure Communities on crime rates. The focus of this paper differs, however, because I am looking at the change in immigration policy that occurred later under president Obama as well as the legal change under the California the Trust Act.²

The effects of recent local policies toward immigrants in the US are the subjects of a growing body of research. For example, [Watson \[2014\]](#) shows that deportations reduce the welfare participation rates of both illegal and legal immigrants. [Watson \[2013\]](#) shows that counties that enrolled in a special partnership with the federal agency to directly act as immigration officers experienced a drop in the immigration population that moved toward

²Also, in [Miles and Cox \[2014\]](#), they do not have precise information on the level of enforcement prior to Secure Communities, while I can measure the change in enforcement following the policy. Moreover, they cannot decompose local from federal enforcement.

other counties instead of going back to their country of origin as hoped by the promoters of such partnerships. Several other papers analyze the effects of E-Verify, a national employment verification program, on the labor market outcomes of undocumented workers ([Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak \[2012\]](#)) and immigrant population ([Bohn et al. \[2014\]](#)).

The literature on the political economy of immigration usually focuses on the conflict between the rich and the poor ([Benhabib \[1996\]](#), [Mayda \[2006\]](#)) or between skilled and unskilled workers ([Ortega \[2005\]](#)). Moreover, immigration policy is usually considered a national matter, while I consider it at the subnational level as well. From a policy perspective, I show how the effects of federal or state immigration reforms crucially depend on the reaction of local governments. For example, deferring removal action toward some categories of undocumented aliens or restricting access to welfare benefits may trigger a counter reaction of local communities to keep the desired amount of deportation intensity.

This paper is also closely related to the literature on the political economy of law enforcement. [García-Jimeno \[2016\]](#) analyzes the dynamics of law enforcement under Prohibition and is able to disentangle the evolution of beliefs over the success of the policy from the evolution of moral values to explain the observed rise and later fall of Prohibition enforcement. As in my case, the local enforcement decisions were an essential determinant of the success (failure) of the federal policy. In another context, [Casaburi and Troiano \[2016\]](#) analyze the effects of a large anti-tax-evasion program on the reelection of incumbent mayors. They find significant positive effects in particular in areas with lower tax evasion tolerance and with higher efficiency of public goods provision, suggesting complementarities among enforcement policies and civic capital. In terms of methodology, this paper has an approach similar to [Cascio and Washington \[2014\]](#), which investigates the impact of the Voting Rights Act on voter turnout and state transfers to black communities using a triple difference estimator comparing states with literacy tests and different black share of the county population.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides institutional background on the deportation process and the policy change. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 outlines the hypotheses. Section 5 shows the estimation strategy and the results.

Section 6 presents the robustness analysis. Section 7 offers a summary and conclusions.

2 Background

In this section, I describe details of the deportation process, the historical context that led to the policy change and the local reaction. In the United States, all non-citizens are potentially subject to deportation if certain conditions occur. By law, undocumented immigrants, who do not have the legal right to stay in the country, should be deported. Most of the undocumented come from Latin America, they have low levels of education and are more likely to be male (Passel and Center [2005]). The undocumented population experienced a surge since the 1990s which continued until 2006 and stabilized to around 11 millions, or 4% of the US population. Also, non-citizen legal resident, can be deported if they commit what the US immigration law defines as an aggravated felony. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides a list of aggravated felonies that includes violent crimes but also, for example, counterfeiting and theft or burglary if the term of imprisonment is at least one year.

Deportations may be of individuals apprehended at the border by the Customs and Border Protection or of people living in the US. Border removals consist almost entirely of people crossing the border from Mexico that are immediately sent back. Most of non-border deportations start instead with the arrest by a local police officer. Then, ICE can simply ask to hold in jail the identified criminal alien issuing a detainer. Detainers are requests to the local enforcement agencies to hold for 48 hours the arrestee until ICE is able to pick them up in jail. If the local enforcement agency collaborates with the request, then the arrestee will enter into ICE custody to be later removed.

In the aftermath of 9/11, which shifted attention to national security, removals from the interior of the US of non citizen increased both in absolute numbers and relative to the estimates of undocumented population living in the country. They peaked during the first term of the Obama administration and then they collapsed after several policy changes were introduced in the second term. ICE deported 69,478 immigrants from the interior of the

United States in 2015, down from 229,235 in 2010 (figure 1).

Local jurisdictions played an important role in the surge of interior immigration enforcement in the 2000s. The inability of Congress to pass comprehensive legislation on immigration at the national level because of political disagreements resulted in the proliferation of local measures. The local measures were either in support of immigrants, as in so called sanctuary cities, or against immigrants, making it harder for them to access employment, housing and welfare. [Steil and Vasi \[2014\]](#) find that significant determinants of pro immigrants ordinances are Democratic share of votes in the presidential election of 2004 and education. An important predictor of ordinances is latino population growth. The federal immigration agency, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE from now on), introduced several partnerships with local enforcement agencies, such as the 287(g) program, the Criminal Alien program and Secure Communities. The possibility of accessing local jails facilitated dramatically the task of identifying undocumented people for deportation and potentially allowed to focus on individuals who represented a threat to national security. The Secure Communities program further eased the task of identifying removable aliens by automatically sending fingerprints of arrestees to ICE.

Reflecting a shift in government priorities of the Obama administration, under pressure from immigration advocacy groups, in June 2011 the ICE director issued a memo to ICE agents to prioritize deportation of criminal aliens who represent a serious threat to national security.³ The memo particularly points to limited enforcement resources and thus to the need to prioritize. In practice, the consequence was a dramatic reduction in the number of immigrants ICE deported. In June 2012, a new memo of the ICE explicitly states that certain categories of undocumented would not be deported, in particular children, with the introduction of deferred action for childhood arrivals (DACA). Finally in October 2014, president Obama by presidential executive order, deferred deportation for other categories of undocumented, Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA), and replaced the Secure Communities program with a new program called the

³<https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf>

Priority Enforcement Program, which is still based on fingerprints sent to the ICE but acknowledges that collaboration of the local enforcement agency is voluntary.

Starting from 2011, several counties limited their collaboration with ICE to serious crimes. In practice, they released deportable aliens from jail before the ICE can arrest them, unless they have committed a serious crime. Sheriffs and county councils motivated their decision with concerns regarding immigrants' trust in the police and their cooperation in arresting criminals. They also point to limited resources being spent on paying for inmates waiting for the ICE to pick them up. For example the Cook County council in Illinois, in an ordinance approving the limits to cooperation with immigration authorities, states that

“...it costs Cook County approximately \$43,000 per day to hold individuals “believed to be undocumented” pursuant to ICE detainers, and Cook County can no longer afford to expend taxpayer funds to incarcerate individuals who are otherwise entitled to their freedom ...
... having the Sheriff of Cook County participate in the enforcement of ICE detainers places a great strain on our communities by eroding the public trust the Sheriff depends on to secure the accurate reporting of criminal activity and to prevent and solve crimes...”

Cook County Board of Commissioners, September 7, 2011

Among the counties that passed similar ordinances, we find many counties that are Democrat strongholds, such as San Francisco, Santa Clara, Philadelphia and Washington. County governments usually give the general direction regarding local immigration enforcement, while the sheriffs make the day-to-day decisions.⁴ It is not unusual that sheriffs disagree with the decision of the county government, but they are forced to follow their lead.⁵

Limited collaboration with ICE was also motivated by several court decisions that made counties liable for keeping immigrants in jail when no crime was committed because of constitutional violations (Altis [2014]). A suspected immigration violation does not constitute a sufficient reason to keep a person in jail. Finally, there was also some reaction at the state level. California passed the Trust Act that went into effect in January 2014. The law forced counties that were not already doing so to limit their cooperation with ICE to serious

⁴County governments have different structure. Depending on the US state, there is a board of supervisors, a commission or a council.

⁵This is the case for example of Los Angeles.

crimes.⁶

3 Data

3.1 Enforcement

My empirical strategy requires data on deportations at the county level for multiple time periods. For this purpose, I made a Freedom of Information Act request to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and got access to monthly deportations data at the county level for the period October 2008 to September 2014. These data refer to the Secure Communities program which is a data interoperability system that automatically transmits information on arrestees to ICE. Prior to its creation, fingerprints taken by Local Enforcement Agencies (LEA) were routinely transmitted to the FBI for the purposes of conducting a criminal background check. Under Secure Communities, these fingerprints are also checked against Department of Homeland Security's Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), which contains data on known immigration violators, known and suspected terrorists, criminal aliens and non-citizens subject to the US-Visit program. Counties got enrolled in different months over the period October 2008-January 2013 when all the counties became enrolled and by June 2011, at the time of the policy change, more than 70% of the US population was living in counties enrolled in the program. I have then an unbalanced panel of counties with up to 73 months and 3181 counties.

The data consist of the different steps in the deportation process:

1. *A*: local arrest
2. *D*: ICE decides whether to initiate deportation (detainer request)
3. *C*: ICE takes arrestee into custody if local agency allows
4. removal

⁶A similar policy was also passed in Connecticut.

Federal discretion is in deciding whether to initiate deportation (detainer request).⁷ Local discretion is in deciding who to arrest and whether to honor the detainer request. The number of non citizen arrested is not a good measure of enforcement because estimates of the undocumented population are imprecise and because there are many confounding factors that determine arrests. Instead, I consider the following measures:

- Total enforcement: $C/A = \text{ICE Custody} / \text{Local Arrests}$
- Federal enforcement: $D/A = \text{Detainers} / \text{Local Arrests}$
- Local enforcement: $C/D = \text{ICE Custody} / \text{Detainers}$

An advantage of using the Secure Communities data is that they allow me to construct a continuous measure of enforcement that is available for all the counties in the US and varies over time. Previous studies had to rely on one time policies implemented in few jurisdictions, while I can track the dynamics of immigration enforcement. Another upside is that my measures of enforcement avoid issues common in other works. [Fasani \[2009\]](#) and [Watson \[2014\]](#) use total number of deportations as enforcement. Even with various controls, that measure is likely to capture crime, while I focus on what happens after the arrest. Finally, these data are particularly useful because they contain all the steps in the deportation process which allow me to separate local and federal enforcement.

Another way to look at the response of counties is to use the county ordinances on limited collaboration for detainers. I retrieve these "no detainer" policies from the Immigrant Legal Resource Center website and I use them as an alternative measure of local enforcement. However, it is not clear how much enforcement drops after those official policies while with Secure Communities data I can measure the extent to which enforcement decreases. Looking at few of these counties, I find that usually local enforcement drops after the ordinance but in some cases I do not observe any reaction in enforcement following the no detainer policy.⁸

One of the issues with these measures is the timing between arrest and entering into ICE custody. Arrestees should first serve the sentence for which they are booked in jail by the

⁷ Federal discretion plays a role also in picking up the detainee. Even though they issued a detainer and so they are interested in deporting the individual, because of limited resources they may give up. However, that part is not possible to separate from local collaboration so we focus on detainers issued for federal enforcement.

⁸For example the ordinance in Philadelphia in 2014 only marginally reduced the share of detainers not in ICE custody.

local police. It is not entirely clear if this is always the case or if the arrestee is handed over to ICE even prior the end of the judicial process and the conviction. In the data, I find an immediate reaction to the Obama guidelines and also a sudden decrease in local enforcement in several counties after a "no detainer" policy. One possible reason, other than they hand over to the ICE before, is that most of these arrests are for minor violations (traffic) or even no crime but just an immigration violation.⁹ Moreover, the data allow me to focus my analysis to less serious offenses where this should be less of a problem.

Another issue is that only a fraction of counties was enrolled before the policy change and they are likely to have different characteristics than the rest of the counties. [Cox and Miles \[2013\]](#) analyze the correlates of early activation in Secure Communities. They find that the most relevant county level explanatory variable was the hispanic share of the population. In particular they reject the hypothesis that Secure Communities was first activated in counties favorable to immigration enforcement. I perform a similar analysis and confirm that Democrat share is not an important predictor of activation date once we take into account the share of non citizen and other controls (table 2). In the empirical analysis, I use the whole sample of US counties as well as the restricted sample of activated counties. I will highlight when the sample makes a difference but results are generally very similar.

Looking at the enforcement measures over time, we can see the effects of the policy changes. Figure 2 shows how total enforcement drastically reduced after the first federal policy change implemented in August 2011. The enforcement measure in the graph is an average weighted by 2010 population of counties enrolled in Secure Communities before May 2010 to have a consistent measure over time. Federal enforcement mirrors the same trend, while local enforcement drops after the policy but in a less sharp way and has a further strong reduction after the California Trust Act.¹⁰ Finally, in table 3, I show the striking variation among districts in federal enforcement.

⁹[TRAC \[2013\]](#).

¹⁰It is clear that the first federal policy change had a strong effect on enforcement while the second guidelines did not seem to impact the trend. Therefore, in the rest of the paper I will consider only the first federal policy change and the California Trust Act.

3.2 Crime and Clearances

When announcing limited collaboration with ICE, counties mention two main reasons:

1. Fear of immigrants in contacting the police if witness or victim of a crime
2. Detaining immigrants for ICE is costly distracting resources from police activity

Both these effects may lower police efficacy. At the same time, critics of these policies claim that they reduce the deterrent effect of secure community thus increasing crime. One measure of police effectiveness is the clearance rate, the number of reported criminal offenses that is cleared by an arrest (İmrohoroğlu et al. [2004], Mas [2006] and Paré et al. [2007]). Clearance is the term used by the FBI and the reporting agencies and simply means that the police have obtained enough evidence to arrest a person for the particular offense. If immigrants collaborate less with the police, as witness for example, it is going to be harder to arrest the offender. Moreover, less resources decrease police productivity. Using monthly data from the Uniform Crime Report, I construct a measure of crime rate $\frac{crime}{population}$ and clearance rate $\frac{clearances}{crimes}$. As we can see in figures 3 and 4, the distributions have a mass at zero and there are some outliers very far from the median value. This is the reason I replicate my results using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation that have a less skewed distribution (figure 5 and 6). Moreover, I use yearly data from the FBI on the number of police officers per capita to serve as additional controls in our empirical analysis. The crimes covered by UCR are violent crimes that include murders, manslaughters, rapes, robberies, assaults, and property crimes that include burglary, larceny, vehicle theft. There are no traffic violations, driving under influence and drug related crimes that constitute the majority of detainers cited offense (but for the majority of detainers there is no offense other than a immigration violation).

One of the limits of the data is that the UCR has reported crimes to the police instead of actual crimes. This may be problematic in our case because if undocumented immigrants are scared of contacting the police, they will not only avoid to serve as witness but also avoid to report crimes to the police. However, we can specifically look at crimes like murders where the probability that the police finds out about the crime is sensibly higher than say rape.

Moreover, if that was the case, it would be another piece of evidence that enforcement makes harder the job for the police. There is also well known measurement error in UCR data. To cope with this problem, I follow the literature in imputing year estimates to quarters when needed. Around 7% of the sample requires these adjustments.

3.3 County Characteristics

Our empirical analysis requires exogenous cross-sectional variation among counties in terms of preferences over enforcement and potential impact of the policy change. I collect several covariates that may be important determinant of preferences. On the political side, I focus on the Democrat and Republican share of voters in the 2008 presidential election that I retrieve from Dave Leip's atlas of US presidential elections (Leip [2012]). The Republican party has had more restrictive positions on immigration at least in recent years . According to a 2015 survey of the Pew Research Center, among Republicans, 71% say immigrants in the U.S. are making crime worse, compared with just 34% of Democrats. Meanwhile, Republicans are just half as likely as Democrats (24% vs. 55%) to say immigrants are not having much effect on crime. In alternative specifications, I also consider the percentage of voters for the Republican party in the 2012 presidential election.

Other characteristics of the counties may be important determinants of attitudes toward immigration. Several works in the political economy of immigration emphasized the importance of the conflict between skilled and unskilled labor given the different effects that immigration has on labor market outcomes of those groups (Mayda [2006]). I then consider education, the share of population having a bachelor degree, to control for workers preferences. On the labor demand side, I look at the sectoral composition of the economy and in particular the share of workers in the service sector since firms recruiting needs may influence the local government to be more lenient with immigrants. Finally, I use a measure of urbanicity from the National Center for Health Statistics. The American Community Survey provides these data at the county level as well as the non citizen share of the population in a county using the five years sample from 2006 to 2010.

4 Hypotheses

In this section, I describe a way of thinking about the strategic relationship between federal and local enforcement and the channels by which they affect crime and policing. In the appendix, I present a simple model that formalizes the discussion. There are two reasons local enforcement could react to a drop in federal enforcement. If federal and local efforts have some degree of complementarity in determining the overall level of enforcement, then a fall in federal enforcement reduces incentives to invest in local enforcement by a local government that derives some utility from immigration enforcement. Even pro immigrant communities are generally in favor of deporting those individuals that commit horrible crimes. Alternatively, counties may increase local enforcement to compensate for a lower federal enforcement and to implement their own preferences. Anti immigrant counties may be particularly risk averse and want to avoid a substantial drop in total enforcement. Preferences of the local governments determine the degree of strategic complementarity and even whether the two efforts are substitutes or complements. Counties with different characteristics (preferences) may react in a different way to the Obama guidelines.

Federal enforcement may also vary by county, even within ICE federal districts. First, it can strategically react to local enforcement. Federals may have disinvested in counties that stopped collaborating with ICE. If the sheriff does not hand over certain immigrants, there is no point in issuing a detainer request. Second, ICE may have its own priorities. In other words, they may care more about counties with certain characteristics, as for example counties with more immigrants or in urban areas. Even local politics could potentially be considered directly by a federal government in directing resources to more politically aligned constituencies. When the directive of the ICE director came out, districts may have further focused resources on those counties or uniformly reduced resources. In absence of clear details on the ICE goals and procedures, it remains an empirical question.

Immigration enforcement may directly affect crime at least in two ways. First, it has a deterrence effect on immigrants to commit less crimes to avoid being deported ([Becker \[1968\]](#)),

Abrams [2012]). Second, it affects the size of the immigrant population, since deportations actually remove people from the county. This last channel may reduce the number of crimes but has an ambiguous effect on crime rates depending on whether immigrants commit more or less crimes than natives. If immigrants have a higher propensity of committing crime than natives then crime rates should go down if immigration enforcement reduces immigrant population.

A concern related to crime is the impact of immigration enforcement on the ability of the police to fight crime, which in turn has an indirect effect on crime. Sheriffs and county supervisors that announced limiting their collaboration with ICE mentioned two reasons. One is that enforcement compromises the relationship of the police with the immigrant community. In particular, the fear of contacting the police for being deported induces the undocumented to report less crime and serve as witness in crime cases. It undermines what is known in the criminology literature as community policing (Greene and Mastrofski [1988]). Second, immigration enforcement could distract resources of the law enforcement agencies to fight crime. Keeping inmates in jail for the sole reason of immigration violation is very costly and may subtract resources to patrol and arrest criminals.

Together, these two channels may reduce the probability of arresting those who committed a crime. I can then test whether the reform had an impact at the county level on crime rates and clearance rates, the ratio of crimes cleared by an arrest. When looking at the effect of the policy on outcomes at the county level, I exploit the fact that counties with a higher non citizen share should be more impacted by these policies. Moreover, county level enforcement changed at a different rate depending on county preferences over immigration which depend on their characteristics. The effect of the Obama guidelines should be greater among counties with high non citizen share and characteristics that particularly reduced enforcement.

5 Empirical Analysis

5.1 Enforcement

The first objective of the paper is to analyze the heterogenous response of enforcement. Then, I will exploit the variation in enforcement response for our analysis on crime related outcomes. In describing the institutional background, I discussed how several counties formally decided to limit their collaboration with the ICE and how this occurred mostly in communities that tend to vote Democrat. Therefore, I focus on the Democratic share of voters in the 2008 presidential election.

I run the following regressions where total, local and federal enforcement are regressed on the policy interacted with county characteristics

$$\text{Enforcement}_{ct} = \alpha_c + \alpha_t + \phi(\text{Guidelines}_t \times \text{democratic share}_c) + \gamma W_{ct} + \zeta_{ct}$$

where the specification includes county and time (quarter) effects and county specific time varying controls W . Standard errors are clustered at the county level, as in all the rest of the analysis, to control for autocorrelation in the error term. In all specifications, W includes dummies for the ICE federal districts and states interacted with time dummies to take into account the wide heterogeneity in federal enforcement changes among districts and be able to focus on the role of local characteristics.

If the Obama guidelines generated a different reaction in Democratic counties, inducing them to particularly reduce local enforcement relatively to Republican counties, the coefficient on the interaction between *Guidelines* and Democratic share should be negative. Column (1) in table 4 reports the basic specification for local enforcement with Democratic share interacted with the policy. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level indicating that more Democratic counties reduced more local enforcement. The result is in line with anecdotal evidence described before. Democratic counties reduced more local enforcement but once I account for other factors, it may be the case that partisanship is not the relevant driver of local preferences. Column (2) expands the analysis introducing sev-

eral characteristics interacted with the policy change. In particular, I consider non-citizen share, bachelor share and a measure of how rural is the county. The negative significant coefficient shows that Democratic share is still a significant predictor of change in local enforcement while the other factors are not significant. A one standard deviation increase in Democratic share decreases the ratio of ICE custody over detainees by around 5%.

In columns (3) and (4) I conduct a similar analysis for federal enforcement, that it is measured as the ratio of detainees over local arrests of non-citizens. The coefficient for Democrat is not significant showing no evidence that federal districts offset lower local enforcement in Democrat counties by increasing federal enforcement. Finally, in columns (5) and (6) I analyze the effects on total enforcement which I measure as the ratio of ICE arrests over local arrests of non-citizens. In both cases, the coefficient for Democrat share is negative although significance is lost with the extra controls.

To check that results are not driven by outliers, in table 5, I redo the analysis using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the enforcement measures which corresponds to $\log(x + \sqrt{1 + x^2})$ and find very similar results.

In the data section, I discussed a few concerns regarding our enforcement measures. One of the concerns is the timing between local arrest and ICE arrest. The other one is that enforcement measures will be less comparable between counties if the type of crimes for which the immigrants are arrested is very different in different counties. To provide evidence that this is not driving our results, I focus on non serious crimes that require lower months in jail. Democrat share is still a significant predictor of local enforcement (table 6).

All the results shown here for enforcement are limited to counties enrolled in Secure Communities at the time of the policy. However, in the data section I showed how Democratic share is not a significant predictor of the month of activation in the program. Moreover, I will provide evidence that results for crime and policing hold when looking only at counties enrolled before the Obama guidelines.

5.2 Crime and Policing

In this section, I outline my approach to estimate the effects of the Obama guidelines on crime and policing. Importantly, a regression of outcomes on our measures of enforcement would be misspecified. First, there is a spurious correlation between enforcement and clearance rate given that clearances also include arrests of immigrants. Second, there is an obvious endogeneity problem. For example, an increase in crime may induce the local law enforcement agency to seek more deportations while an increase in efforts to fight crime may reduce resources devoted to immigration enforcement. Instead, my initial empirical strategy exploits variation across counties in the relevance of the policy. I implement a difference-in-differences approach based on non-citizen share of the population. The idea is that immigration enforcement should have an impact only in counties where there are non-citizens. Deportations may have an impact on crime in Los Angeles but should have no impact in North Dakota. Our initial specification is

$$y_{ct} = \alpha_c + \alpha_t + \beta(\text{Guidelines}_t \times \text{non citizen share}_c) + \gamma W_{ct} + \zeta_{ct}$$

where y is clearance rate, crime level in its inverse hyperbolic sine transformation or crime rate and *Guidelines* is the period after the policy decision. In terms of controls, there are county and time fixed effects and some time variant W which in the baseline specification are state and federal district dummies interacted with time dummies. The sample consists of a quarterly panel of all the US counties from October 2008, the start of the Secure Communities program, to September 2014. As a start date I chose October 2008 to analyze the same period covered in the enforcement analysis and also because it gives roughly the same number of quarters pre and post the Obama guidelines.

The first outcome I analyze is the clearance rate for violent crimes. Column (1) of table 7 reports the coefficient for non citizen share which is positive and statistically significant at 1% level. In column (2), I introduce extra controls interacted with the policy change and find a positive coefficient of 0.24 significant at the 1% level. In terms of magnitude, a one standard

deviation increase in non-citizen share increases the impact of the policy on clearance rate for violent crimes of nearly 1%. In columns 3 and 4, I show results for clearance rate of property crimes. The effect is smaller but still statistically significant. Turning my attention to crime, I show results for levels of violent and property crimes in columns 5 to 8. I do not find any statistically significant effect. When I look at crime rates I find even negative effects, but those lose significance when we use an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation and thus may be driven by outliers (table 8). Therefore, I do not find any evidence that the Obama guidelines increased crime but if anything they reduced it. Multiple explanations can rationalize these results. It is possible that immigrants commit few serious crimes thus limiting the deterrent effect of deportations but also that better policing helped to prevent crimes.

The enforcement analysis shows that there is heterogeneity in the enforcement reaction among counties. Even in a county that has a strong immigrant community, if enforcement does not drop significantly, effects on police outcomes will be limited. Therefore, I would like to incorporate this heterogeneity in the difference in differences analysis. In particular, Democratic share of votes was a main determinant of change in enforcement. What the DID was showing was the average effect of Democrat and Republican counties. Then, I implement a triple difference in difference strategy using the Democrat share of voters in the 2008 presidential election at the county level. The coefficient of interest is given by the triple interaction between the policy, non-citizen and Democrat share, while the simple interaction between *Democrat* and *Guidelines* controls for factors affecting outcomes differently between Democrat and Republican that have nothing to do with the policy. Conceptually, we are looking at how a difference in the non-citizen share between counties has a larger effect after the guidelines in places with higher Democrat share. Our identification assumption is that for a given increase in non-citizen share, there would have not been a differential change in trend between Democrat and Republican counties without the Obama guidelines. Our main

specification is

$$y_{ct} = \alpha_c + \alpha_t + \beta(\text{Guidelines}_t \times \text{non citizen share}_c) + \psi(\text{Guidelines}_t \times \text{democratic}_c) \\ + \phi(\text{Guidelines}_t \times \text{democratic}_c \times \text{non citizen share}_c) + \gamma W_{ct} + \zeta_{ct}$$

where y is clearance rate or crime rate and the coefficient of interest is ϕ .

In column 1 of table 9 referring to clearance rate of violent crimes, we observe that the coefficient on the triple interaction is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Results are similar when adding extra controls with a coefficient of 1.1, significant at 1 percent (column 2). For a one standard deviation increase in non-citizen share, moving a county from the lowest to the highest Democratic share increases clearance rate of 3.5%.

In column 3, looking at clearance rate of property crimes, the coefficient on the triple interaction is positive and significant but around a third of the one for violent crimes. However, the coefficient is not significant when adding extra controls. The results suggest a bigger impact of immigration enforcement on fighting violent crimes than property crimes.

At this point, we want to check whether there is any effect on crime. If crime disproportionately increased in Democratic counties with high proportion of non-citizens, then we have evidence that immigration enforcement reduces crime. Columns 5 and 6 in table 9 show results for total number of violent crimes and columns 7 and 8 for property crimes both in inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. There is no significant effect on crime levels or crime rates (table 10).

Reminding our caveat that we are measuring only reported crimes, we do not find evidence that the Obama guidelines increased crime. To provide some evidence that Obama's policy did not increase crime I focus on murders and manslaughters only where the problem of reporting should be less serious than for example in cases of rapes. It is very likely that sooner or later the police finds out about a person that is killed while rape is considered the most under-reported crime in the US. Again, I do not find a significant effect on those crimes (table 11 in appendix).

5.3 Identification Assumption

For the triple difference approach to be valid we need to not violate the parallel trends assumption. In general in a discrete setting, this assumption requires that the relative dynamic of both treatment and control would have been the same in the absence of the shock. In this case, for a given increase in non-citizen share, the relative dynamic of Democrat and Republican counties would have been the same in the absence of the policy change. The issue is that the results may simply reflect a pre-policy differential trend in unobservables between Democrat and Republican given a certain non-citizen share. To test for pre-trends, I develop an event study type of analysis

$$y_{ct} = \alpha_c + \alpha_t + \sum_{\tau} \beta_{\tau} (Noncitizen_c \times P_t^{\tau}) + \sum_{\tau} \psi_{\tau} (Democrat_c \times P_t^{\tau}) + \sum_{\tau} \phi_{\tau} (Noncitizen_c \times Democrat_c \times P_t^{\tau}) + \epsilon_{ct}$$

where P_t^{τ} is a dummy equal to 1 if $\tau = t$. In figure 7, I plot estimates of the coefficients ϕ . For the identification assumption to hold, the coefficient ϕ should be not significantly different from zero before the policy. Interactions with one quarter before the policy is omitted to identify the model.

The coefficient β captures the change in the gradient of clearance in noncitizen share between the second quarter of 2011 and quarter τ for comparison (Republican) counties, while the sum $\beta + \phi$ captures that change for treatment (Democrat) counties. The picture is very clear. The triple interaction term is a significant predictor of clearances only after the Obama guidelines. Importantly, no coefficient is statistically significant from zero before the policy. Right after the policy the coefficient becomes positive and significant and enters in a new trend. ¹¹

¹¹Finally, I can formally test whether the coefficients pre-policy are not significantly different with each other. The F test cannot reject the hypothesis that

$$H_0 : \phi_{-9} = \phi_{-8} \dots = \phi_0$$

with a p value of 0.46.

6 Robustness Analysis

6.1 Specification Tests

In the previous section, we saw how clearance rate for violent crimes disproportionately increased more in high immigrant communities in Democrat relative to Republican counties. In this section, I want to test several specifications to verify certain implicit assumptions I make while running my main specification. Table 12 shows different specifications for the triple difference analysis on clearances of violent crimes. Column 1 is the main specification with county and time fixed effects, county specific linear time trend and state and districts fixed effects interacted with time fixed effects. In the enforcement analysis, we saw that Democratic counties reduced more enforcement but the result was limited to the sample of counties already enrolled in Secure Communities before the Obama guidelines. We already checked that Democrat share is not a significant predictor of early activation in the program. Now we verify that the results hold when looking only at counties already enrolled in Secure Communities before the Obama guidelines. The coefficient of interest is still significant and very similar to the one in the baseline.

The empirical model treats the effect of Democratic share of votes as linear. In fact, it could be that a discontinuity arises when Democrats have a majority of votes and thus can determine who is in the county board and elect the sheriff. One way to test for nonlinearities is to add the interaction of a dummy for Democrats being a majority with guidelines plus an additional interaction with non-citizen share. I consider a county having a Democrat majority if the share of Democrat voters in the presidential election is greater than the Republican share. The coefficient on the triple interaction is significant but higher than in the baseline suggesting a slightly lower elasticity for counties with Democrat majority. However, the coefficient for Democrat majority is negative but not significant suggesting non-linearities are not a relevant problem.

Another important concern is that Republican counties are not valid comparisons for Democratic counties even after controlling for several other characteristics. First, I want to

check that the two types of counties are comparable in terms of non-citizen share. I show that trimming the sample in order to get a common support over non-citizen share between counties in the top quartile and the bottom quartile of the Democratic share, the results are unaffected. A related concern is that immigrants may be different between Democrat and Republican counties. Results then may be reflect different composition of immigrants instead of local preferences. Suppose for example that only undocumented immigrants fear the police and that they are concentrated in Democratic counties. Then, greater effects of the policy in Democrats may be explained by higher share of undocumented for the same level of non-citizens. To provide some evidence that this is not a major concern, I replicate the analysis using the hispanic non citizen share instead of the whole non citizen population given that undocumented immigrants are disproportionately hispanic. Again, results are very similar in magnitude and statistical significance. As an additional check on the parallel trend assumption, I show results with county specific linear time trends. The coefficient is similar to the baseline and statistically significant at 1%. Finally, given the skewed distribution of the dependent variable, I present results with the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation in table ???. The result still holds.

6.2 Alternative Explanations

I showed evidence that clearance rates relatively increased in counties with a higher share of immigrants after a policy drastically reducing immigration enforcement, while crime rates do not differentially increase. However, other channels may have contributed to the differential change in clearance rates between counties with and without immigration and between Democrat and Republican counties.

One important predictor of clearance rates is the number of police officers. In column 1 of table 13, I introduce the yearly (log) number of police officers from the Uniform Crime Report and find very similar results. Economic conditions can also be an important omitted variable that has both an effect on enforcement and on crime. Local governments may change enforcement depending on the needs of the firms (Fasani [2009]) or the unemployment of

workers. At the same time, better economic conditions tend to reduce crime and can also affect the efficiency of the police. Furthermore, the period under scrutiny coincides with the Great Recession. For this reason, I control for labor demand shocks using a Bartik shock at a yearly frequency¹². The control is not significant and the coefficients of interest are similar to the baseline.

Another potential threat to identification are represented by other changes in immigration enforcement in particular at the state level. This last decade has been a period of high activism by state and local governments on immigration policy. With the Congress unable to pass comprehensive reforms, states passed laws regarding employment restrictions (Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak [2012]), driver licenses, in-state tuition and welfare access. Municipalities passed several ordinance either pro or anti immigration mostly in the period around 2006. I made an effort to collect all these policies that I can use as controls. One policy very related to our context is the 287g agreements between local (and state) governments and ICE which allowed local law enforcement to directly enforce immigration law. Los Angeles and San Bernardino entered the program in 2005 and since then other 66 counties joined the program. The Obama administration ended part of these agreements at the end of 2012, so these programs are no longer in effect.

At the state level, I am already controlling in my main specification for state interacted with time fixed effects. However, the importance of the policies may be heterogenous within the state. In column 3 of table 13, I introduce as additional control the (log) number of firms enrolled in the E-Verify program that enables firms to electronically check the legal status of the employees. In column 4, I introduce an interaction between having a 287g agreement and

¹² The idea is to use industry shares in a county and changes in employment (or wages) for the different industries at the national level excluding that particular county. National levels are not affected by a single county and interacted with industry shares of the county they are correlated with changes in employment in the county. Therefore, it is a valid instrument for labor demand changes and can be written as

$$\Delta B_{c,t} = \sum_{ind} (\log(E_{ind,-c,t}) - \log(E_{ind,-c,0})) \frac{E_{ind,c,0}}{E_{c,0}}$$

where period 0 can be considered the year before the start of the sample so the 2008. I construct this measure using several years of the ACS which provides a repeated cross-section of individuals with information on employment, industry and location. The lowest geographical unit is an area called PUMA and for several individuals I need to impute the county using the population share of county in a PUMA provided by the Census crosswalk.

the dummy for periods after the guidelines to see if the end of these agreements is affecting our results. However, since most of the 287g agreements operated in counties leaning Republican, if anything we should see a stronger reduction in enforcement in Republican counties which goes in the opposite direction of our results.

In both specifications, the results are not substantively affected (table 13). If anything, the coefficient on the triple interaction is slightly greater which is in line with the fact that the reaction of the counties to the federal program was greater once we take into account the end of the 287g program.

6.3 California Trust Act

Up to this point, we analyzed the impact of the Obama guidelines to learn how federal and local enforcement interplay and their effect on several outcomes at the county level. To bring further evidence, I analyze the impact of a similar policy, the California Trust Act, that had the intention of reducing local enforcement. Before the implementation of the law in January 2014, several counties already decided to limit their compliance with ICE, especially those with a long history of being a sanctuary city, but many other counties kept full collaboration. The pressure from the Latino electorate, convinced Democrat governor Brown to approve the law on October 5th 2013, after vetoing a similar measure in 2012. The law similarly to the federal guidelines had the goal to reduce enforcement. It would be then reassuring to show that it determined a similar impact on crime and policing of the federal policy.

In table 14 I show the effects of the Trust Act on local enforcement, crime and clearances. The first method is to use a simple dummy for the policy

$$y_{ct} = \alpha_c + \alpha_t + \psi(Post_t \times California_c) + \gamma W_{ct} + \zeta_{ct}$$

where I include the extra controls and the county specific linear time trend but I remove districts fixed effects to achieve identification. I also add Democrat and non citizen share interacted with time to control for the fact that California has more immigrants and it is also leaning Democrat. The sample consists of quarters post Obama guidelines given there

was probably a differential change in trend between California counties and the rest of the US after the guidelines.

In column (1), we see that the policy had the intended effect to reduce local enforcement. The number of detainees that actually turn into ICE arrests significantly drop in California with respect to the rest of the US. Federal enforcement did not have the same fall (column 2), while total enforcement drops following local enforcement (column 3). Turning the attention to police outcomes, clearance rate for violent crimes increased of 7.8% while clearance rate for property crimes of 3% with respect to what would have happened without any change in trend due to the policy. No particular effect emerges for crime levels or crime rates.

Second, I implement a triple difference framework. The Trust Act should have a greater impact on crime and clearances in counties with higher non-citizen share. Therefore, I use the following specification

$$\begin{aligned}
 y_{ct} = & \alpha_c + \alpha_t + \beta(\text{Guidelines}_t \times \text{non citizen share}_c) + \psi(\text{Guidelines}_t \times \text{democratic}_c) \\
 & + \phi(\text{Guidelines}_t \times \text{democratic}_c \times \text{non citizen share}_c) + \beta(\text{Post}_t \times \text{non citizen share}_c) + \\
 & \psi(\text{Post}_t \times \text{California}_c) + \phi(\text{Post}_t \times \text{California}_c \times \text{non citizen share}_c) + \gamma W_{ct} + \zeta_{ct}
 \end{aligned}$$

where the coefficient of interest is the triple interaction between a dummy for periods after the law, a dummy for counties in California and the non-citizen share. In this specification, I use the whole sample starting from October 2008. Therefore, the equation includes the variables relative to the Obama guidelines to take into account the change in trends due to the policy change.

Table 15 shows the results which are qualitatively the same of the federal guidelines. For the clearance rate of violent crimes, the coefficient on the triple interaction is 0.34 statistically significant at the 1% level and 0.296 with with the extra controls with significance at 5% level. The interpretation is that in California counties after the policy, a one standard deviation increase in non citizen share raises the clearance rate of 3.9 percentage points. Therefore, the impact is substantial while I fail to find any effect on clearance of property crimes and

on crime levels or rates.

7 Conclusions

This paper studies the effects of immigration enforcement on crime and policing using the variation generated by a policy change to the process of deporting immigrants in the United States that prioritized deportations of dangerous criminals and precipitated a 70% fall in non-border removals between 2011 and 2015. The policy provides a source of exogenous variation in federal enforcement, which allows me to analyze the strategic relationship between local and federal immigration enforcement and their effects on crime and policing efficiency.

My main results can be summarized in three points. First, I show that Democratic counties reduced local enforcement more than did Republican counties after the policy. Second, using the Democratic share of voters as a source of variation in local preferences on immigration and the non-citizen population share as a measure of the potential impact of the policy, I find that there is no significant evidence that the policy change led to an increase in violent or property crimes. Third, using the same method, I find by contrast a positive effect on clearance rates, particularly for violent crimes. These results indicate that reducing immigration enforcement did not increase crime and rather led to an increase in policing efficiency, either because it allowed police to focus efforts on solving crimes or because it elicited greater cooperation of non-citizens with police.

Moreover, the results suggest that the degree of alignment of local and federal preferences is essential in determining the overall level of enforcement and therefore the impact of federal policies. This is particularly relevant in the US deportation system where multiple layers - county, federal district and national government - are involved in the process, but it is also relevant in contexts besides immigration. The degree of decentralization in enforcement and how that affects local outcomes is an interesting avenue for future research. Also, I show in my results a form of substitution between crime enforcement and pure immigration enforcement. One natural future step will be to explore how shocks to a particular type of

enforcement have consequences on other types. In this case, lower immigration enforcement freed resources that may have been used to intensify arrests of certain ethnic groups.

The policy implications of this work apply not only to the US but also saliently to European countries, with the caveat that refugees may be a very different type of immigrant than in the US, where there is an ongoing debate on whether to create a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants or to increase deportations. If reducing crime is the primary policy objective, the option of deporting more immigrants is sub-optimal.

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Appendix

Enforcement Game

After the Obama guidelines, several counties started to limit collaboration with ICE. Here, I want to propose a framework where local governments strategically react to a change in federal enforcement. The players of the game are the local government and the federal district that both maximize deportations subject to a (monetary and political) cost. In the model, federal and local enforcement contribute to deportations (total enforcement) with a certain degree of complementarity. The Obama guidelines increase the cost of federal enforcement for the district which reduces federal enforcement. Unless local and federal enforcement are perfect substitutes, lower federal enforcement decrease the returns from local enforcement. At the same time, a lower federal enforcement may induce local governments to substitute and increase local enforcement to keep the desired level of deportations. In the model, this willingness to substitute is regulated by a risk averse parameter in the utility from deportations.

Here I want to formalize the idea. Consider a Stackelberg game where the federal district moves first and the local government moves second. Enforcement d is the combination of local e and federal f according to a CES production function

$$d = (e^\rho + f^\rho)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \quad (1)$$

In the second stage, local government maximizes

$$\max_{e \geq 0} \frac{d^\theta}{\theta} - C(e) \quad (2)$$

where

$$\theta = F(\lambda X) ; F'(\cdot) > 0 \quad (3)$$

can be interpreted as a risk loving parameter (equivalent to CRRA) which increases the

elasticity of e with respect to f . It depends on county characteristics X .

In the first stage, federal district maximizes

$$\max_{f \geq 0} \mu d(e(f), f) - K(f, P) \quad (4)$$

where $\mu = \psi Z$ is a preference parameter that depends on characteristics of the county relevant for the federal district but not for the local government and P is a shifter of the cost of federal enforcement which represents our federal policy change. We can imagine the Obama guidelines as an increase in P . Robust comparative statics deliver the following result

Proposition 7.1. *Local enforcement e and federal enforcement f are strategic complement (substitute) if and only if $\theta > \rho$ ($\theta < \rho$).*

Moreover, e_f is increasing in θ .

Thus, characteristics of the county determine the sign and the degree of complementarity. The results is intuitive. More risk averse counties (low θ) will tend to substitute more and enforcements will be complement if the level of risk aversion is sufficiently low with respect to the technical elasticity of substitution ρ .

Now consider comparative statics with respect to P .

- f is decreasing in P
- e is decreasing in P iff $\theta > \rho$
- $|e_P|$ is increasing in X if $\lambda > 0$

In our specific context, we will consider democratic share of voters as X . Then, local enforcement will differentially reduce more in democratic counties if $\lambda > 0$.

Tables

Table 1: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Enforcement			
Local enforcement: ICE arrests over detainees	1.065	0.901	20220
Federal enforcement: detainees over non-citizen arrests	0.177	0.253	33256
Total Enforcement: ICE arrests over non-citizen arrests	0.19	0.285	33256
County Characteristics			
non citizen %	0.027	0.036	3066
hispanic non citizen %	0.019	0.031	3065
democrat 2008 presidential election %	0.415	0.137	3066
democrat 2012 presidential election %	0.384	0.146	3066
bachelor %	0.201	0.089	3065
urbanization index	0.624	0.485	3066
services %	0.599	0.079	3065
Outcomes			
clearance rate violent crimes	0.571	0.342	68469
clearance rate property crimes	0.205	0.184	69543
number of violent crimes per 100,000 people	225.882	296.272	79713
number of property crimes per 100,000 people	444.433	445.252	79713

Table 2: Predictors of Late Activation in Secure Communities

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	month activation	month activation	month activation
Democrat	-11.163*** (1.254)	-6.487*** (1.520)	-0.298 (1.720)
Bachelor		-12.297*** (2.080)	-8.905*** (2.111)
services		6.454* (3.875)	0.772 (3.916)
Rural		4.050*** (0.503)	3.586*** (0.503)
Non Citizen			-33.385*** (4.472)
Constant	32.979*** (0.682)	29.174*** (2.063)	31.157*** (2.062)
Observations	3065	3065	3065
Adjusted R^2	0.587	0.607	0.613

Notes: The dependent variables is the month of activation in the Secure Communities program. **Democrat** is the share of voters for the Democratic Party in the 2008 presidential election. **Non Citizen** is the share of non citizen in a county measured with Census 2010 data. Regressions are weighted by 2010 population. Other county characteristics include share of population with a bachelor degree, share of the services industry and a measure of urbanization. Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Variation at Federal District Level in Federal Enforcement D/M

aor	federal enforcement D/M	aor	federal enforcement D/M
BUF	.06	SLC	.153
BOS	.079	SND	.16
CHI	.085	WAS	.168
NEW	.092	DEN	.169
ELP	.096	SEA	.185
SPM	.106	ATL	.203
BAL	.106	PHO	.215
DET	.113	SFR	.229
MIA	.117	HOU	.244
NOL	.118	LOS	.264
NYC	.121	DAL	.287
PHI	.126	SNA	.389

D/M = detainees / local arrests of non citizen. Period 2013-2014

Table 4: Effect of Obama guidelines on enforcement

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	local	local	federal	federal	total	total
Democrat \times guidelines	-0.428*** (0.120)	-0.399** (0.191)	0.010 (0.040)	0.043 (0.043)	-0.089** (0.037)	-0.038 (0.046)
Extra Controls		X		X		X
Observations	17736	17736	28926	28926	28926	28926

Notes: The dependent variables are the local enforcement which is the ratio of ICE arrests over detainees, the federal enforcement which is the ratio of detainees over immigrant arrests and total enforcement which is the ratio of ICE arrests over immigrant arrests. **Guidelines** is an indicator equal to one for months after the Obama guidelines. **Democrat** is the share of voters for the Democratic Party in the 2008 presidential election. In all the specifications, there are county and time fixed effects and federal district and state dummies interacted with time dummies. Regressions are weighted by 2010 population. In column (2), (4) and (6) I include county-level controls interacted with time dummies. Those include share of population with a bachelor degree, share of the services industry and a measure of urbanization. Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Effect of Obama Guidelines on Enforcement (hyp transformation)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	local	local	federal	federal	total	total
Democrat \times guidelines	-0.285*** (0.071)	-0.288** (0.115)	0.007 (0.038)	0.039 (0.041)	-0.087** (0.035)	-0.041 (0.043)
Extra Controls		X		X		X
Observations	13244	13244	21350	21350	21350	21350

Notes: The dependent variables are the local enforcement which is the ratio of ICE arrests over detainees, the federal enforcement which is the ratio of detainees over immigrant arrests and total enforcement which is the ratio of ICE arrests over immigrant arrests. I transform the variables with inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. **Guidelines** is an indicator equal to one for months after the Obama guidelines. **Non Citizen** is the share of non citizen in a county measured with Census 2010 data. **Democrat** is the share of voters for the Democratic Party in the 2008 presidential election. In all the specifications, there are county and time fixed effects and federal district dummies interacted with time dummies. Regressions are weighted by 2010 population. In column (2), (4) and (6) I include county-level controls interacted with time dummies. Those include share of population with a bachelor degree, share of the services industry and a measure of urbanization. Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: Effect of Obama Guidelines on Enforcement. Non Serious Crimes.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	local	local	federal	federal	total	total
Democrat \times guidelines	-0.338*** (0.114)	-0.346** (0.138)	0.028 (0.043)	0.046 (0.046)	-0.049 (0.036)	-0.045 (0.039)
Extra Controls		X		X		X
Observations	16495	16495	27507	27507	27507	27507

Notes: The dependent variables are the local enforcement which is the ratio of ICE arrests over detainees, the federal enforcement which is the ratio of detainees over immigrant arrests and total enforcement which is the ratio of ICE arrests over immigrant arrests. **Guidelines** is an indicator equal to one for months after the Obama guidelines. **Non Citizen** is the share of non citizen in a county measured with Census 2010 data. **Democrat** is the share of voters for the Democratic Party in the 2008 presidential election. In all the specifications, there are county and time fixed effects and federal district dummies interacted with time dummies. Regressions are weighted by 2010 population. In even columns, I include county-level controls interacted with time dummies. Those include share of population with a bachelor degree, share of the services industry and a measure of urbanization. Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 7: Effect of Obama Guidelines on Policing and Crime

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	clearance violent	clearance violent	clearance property	clearance property	violent crimes	violent crimes	property crimes	property crimes
Non Citizen \times guidelines	0.236*** (0.091)	0.296*** (0.090)	0.023 (0.051)	0.080 (0.053)	-1.400 (1.878)	-2.308 (1.952)	-2.138 (2.184)	-3.064 (2.312)
Extra Controls		X		X		X		X
Observations	64824	64824	65695	65695	72093	72093	72093	72093
Adjusted R^2	0.837	0.837	0.728	0.731	0.620	0.622	0.587	0.590

Notes: The dependent variables are the clearance rate for violent crimes which is the ratio of clearances (arrests) over reported crimes, clearance rate for property crimes and the inverse hyperbolic sine transformations of violent and property crimes. **Guidelines** is an indicator equal to one for months after the Obama guidelines. **Non Citizen** is the share of non citizen in a county measured with Census 2010 data. **Democrat** is the share of voters for the Democratic Party in the 2008 presidential election. In all the specifications, there are county and time fixed effects, and federal district and state dummies interacted with time dummies. Regressions are weighted by 2010 population. In even columns, I include county-level controls interacted with the guidelines dummy. Those include share of population with a bachelor degree, share of the services industry and a measure of urbanization. Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 8: Effect of Obama Guidelines on Crime Rates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	viol	viol	prop	prop	hyp viol	hyp viol	hyp prop	hyp prop
Non Citizen \times guidelines	-271.898** (122.664)	-346.800*** (124.723)	-678.875** (304.947)	-866.715*** (313.179)	-0.780 (1.291)	-1.417 (1.331)	-1.553 (1.508)	-2.232 (1.575)
Extra Controls		X		X		X		X
Observations	63081	63081	63081	63081	63081	63081	63081	63081
Adjusted R^2	0.962	0.962	0.939	0.939	0.757	0.757	0.725	0.726

Notes: The dependent variables are violent and property crimes per capita. Columns 5 to 8 present results for the inverse hyperbolic sine transformations of the crime rates. **Guidelines** is an indicator equal to one for months after the Obama guidelines. **Non Citizen** is the share of non citizen in a county measured with Census 2010 data. In all the specifications, there are county and time fixed effects and federal district and state dummies interacted with time dummies. Regressions are weighted by 2010 population. In even columns, I include county-level controls interacted with time fixed effects. Those include share of population with a bachelor degree, share of the services industry and a measure of urbanization. Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 9: Effect of Obama Guidelines on Policing and Crime. Triple Difference

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	clearance violent	clearance violent	clearance property	clearance property	violent crimes	violent crimes	property crimes	property crimes
Non Citizen \times guidelines	-0.340 (0.238)	-0.255 (0.241)	-0.117 (0.165)	0.065 (0.184)	-142.458 (548.294)	-283.484 (579.001)	-1188.963 (1250.478)	-1625.152 (1358.542)
Democrat \times guidelines	-0.104*** (0.035)	-0.081** (0.036)	0.013 (0.049)	0.025 (0.042)	6.666 (44.460)	-15.347 (45.623)	-46.412 (95.874)	-85.054 (99.089)
Non Citizen \times Democrat \times guidelines	1.105*** (0.362)	1.000*** (0.359)	0.179 (0.300)	-0.025 (0.314)	-205.821 (960.873)	-67.198 (979.558)	842.995 (2153.610)	1273.022 (2226.931)
Extra Controls		X		X		X		X
Observations	64478	64478	65348	65348	71637	71637	71637	71637
Adjusted R^2	0.837	0.838	0.728	0.731	0.954	0.955	0.931	0.933

Notes: The dependent variables are the clearance rate for violent crimes which is the ratio of clearances (arrests) over reported crimes, clearance rate for property crimes and the inverse hyperbolic sine transformations of violent and property crimes. **Guidelines** is an indicator equal to one for months after the Obama guidelines. **Non Citizen** is the share of non citizen in a county measured with Census 2010 data. **Democrat** is the share of voters for the Democratic Party in the 2008 presidential election. In all the specifications, there are county and time fixed effects and federal district and state dummies interacted with time dummies. Regressions are weighted by 2010 population. In even columns, I include county-level controls interacted with time fixed effects. Those include share of population with a bachelor degree, share of the services industry and a measure of urbanization. Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 10: Effect of Obama Guidelines on Crime Rates. Triple Difference.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	viol	viol	prop	prop	hyp viol	hyp viol	hyp prop	hyp prop
Non Citizen \times guidelines	-142.458 (548.294)	-283.484 (579.001)	-1188.963 (1250.478)	-1625.152 (1358.542)	-5.134 (5.113)	-6.008 (5.400)	-6.606 (5.832)	-7.558 (6.188)
Democrat \times guidelines	6.666 (44.460)	-15.347 (45.623)	-46.412 (95.874)	-85.054 (99.089)	-0.519 (0.629)	-0.859 (0.650)	-0.648 (0.723)	-1.003 (0.739)
Non Citizen \times Democrat \times guidelines	-205.821 (960.873)	-67.198 (979.558)	842.995 (2153.610)	1273.022 (2226.931)	7.512 (9.351)	8.390 (9.477)	8.820 (10.615)	9.746 (10.758)
Extra Controls		X		X		X		X
Observations	62682	62682	62682	62682	62682	62682	62682	62682
Adjusted R^2	0.962	0.962	0.939	0.939	0.757	0.757	0.725	0.726

Notes: The dependent variables are violent and property crimes per capita. Columns 5 to 8 present results for the inverse hyperbolic sine transformations of the crime rates. **Guidelines** is an indicator equal to one for months after the Obama guidelines. **Non Citizen** is the share of non citizen in a county measured with Census 2010 data. **Democrat** is the share of voters for the Democratic Party in the 2008 presidential election. In all the specifications, there are county and time fixed effects and federal district and state dummies interacted with time dummies. Regressions are weighted by 2010 population. In even columns, I include county-level controls interacted with time fixed effects. Those include share of population with a bachelor degree, share of the services industry and a measure of urbanization. Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 11: Effect of Obama Guidelines on Murders and Manslaughters

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	murders	murders	manslaughters	manslaughters
Non Citizen \times guidelines	-2.953 (2.975)	-3.725 (3.271)	1.441 (1.587)	1.398 (1.700)
Democrat \times guidelines	-0.227 (0.366)	-0.429 (0.366)	-0.066 (0.121)	-0.095 (0.120)
Non Citizen \times Democrat \times guidelines	3.700 (5.291)	4.534 (5.498)	-1.105 (2.582)	-1.097 (2.637)
Extra Controls		X		X
Observations	71637	71637	71637	71637
Adjusted R^2	0.915	0.917	0.663	0.665

Notes: The dependent variables are murders and manslaughters crimes. **Guidelines** is an indicator equal to one for months after the Obama guidelines. **Non Citizen** is the share of non citizen in a county measured with Census 2010 data. **Democrat** is the share of voters for the Democratic Party in the 2008 presidential election. In all the specifications, there are county and time fixed effects and federal district and state dummies interacted with time dummies. Regressions are weighted by 2010 population. In even columns, I include county-level controls interacted with time fixed effects. Those include share of population with a bachelor degree, share of the services industry and a measure of urbanization. Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 12: Effect of Obama Guidelines on Clearance Rate for Violent crimes. Specification Tests.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Non Citizen \times guidelines	-0.340 (0.238)	-0.470* (0.261)	-0.342 (0.240)	-0.323 (0.299)		-0.615 (0.392)	-0.402** (0.200)
Democrat \times guidelines	-0.104*** (0.035)	-0.164*** (0.042)	-0.105*** (0.035)	-0.055 (0.055)	-0.065* (0.034)	-0.084* (0.046)	-0.064** (0.028)
Non Citizen \times Democrat \times guidelines	1.105*** (0.362)	1.467*** (0.415)	1.109*** (0.364)	1.232* (0.656)		1.373** (0.657)	1.040*** (0.323)
Dem maj \times guidelines				-0.015 (0.014)			
Dem maj \times Non Citizen \times guidelines				-0.104 (0.217)			
Hispan Non Citizen \times guidelines					-0.485* (0.279)		
Hispan Non Citizen \times Democrat \times guidelines					1.386*** (0.475)		

	baseline	active before guidelines	common support non-citizen	non linearity	hispanic non-citizen	county specific linear trends	hyperbolic
Observations	64478	30037	64437	64478	64478	64478	64478
Adjusted R^2	0.837	0.844	0.837	0.837	0.837	0.850	0.859

Notes: The dependent variable is the clearance rate of violent crimes which is the ratio of clearances (arrests) over reported crimes. **Guidelines** is an indicator equal to one for months after the Obama guidelines. **Non Citizen** is the share of non citizen in a county measured with Census 2010 data. **Democrat** is the share of voters for the Democratic Party in the 2008 presidential election. **Hispan Non Citizen** is the share of hispanic non citizen in a county measured with Census 2010 data. **Dem maj** is a dummy for counties where the share of Democrat voters is higher than Republican. In all the specifications, there are county and time fixed effects and federal district and state dummies interacted with time dummies. I also include county-level controls interacted with time fixed effects. Those include share of population with a bachelor degree, share of the services industry and a measure of urbanization. Regressions are weighted by 2010 population. Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 13: Effect of Obama Guidelines on Clearance Rate for Violent Crimes. Alternative Explanations.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	clearance violent	clearance violent	clearance violent	clearance violent
Non Citizen \times guidelines	-0.313 (0.252)	-0.340 (0.237)	-0.354 (0.241)	-0.333 (0.232)
Democrat \times guidelines	-0.102*** (0.034)	-0.105*** (0.035)	-0.112*** (0.035)	-0.104*** (0.035)
Non Citizen \times Democrat \times guidelines	1.031*** (0.381)	1.107*** (0.361)	1.145*** (0.368)	1.099*** (0.350)
Officers	-0.000 (0.000)			
Bartik		-0.002 (0.066)		
E-Verify enrolled			-0.009* (0.005)	
287g \times guidelines				-0.002 (0.015)
Observations	64478	64452	59325	64478
Adjusted R^2	0.837	0.837	0.840	0.837

Notes: The dependent variable is the clearance rate of violent crimes which is the ratio of clearances (arrests) over reported crimes. **Guidelines** is an indicator equal to one for months after the Obama guidelines. **Non Citizen** is the share of non citizen in a county measured with Census 2010 data. **Democrat** is the share of voters for the Democratic Party in the 2008 presidential election. **Officers** is the log number of police sworn officers. **Bartik** is the Bartik shock as defined in text. **E-Verify Enrolled** is the log number of firms enrolled in E-Verify in that county. **287g** is a dummy for a county ever participating in the 287g program. In all the specifications, there are county and time fixed effects and federal district and state dummies interacted with time dummies. Regressions are weighted by 2010 population. In even columns, I include county-level controls interacted with time fixed effects. Those include share of population with a bachelor degree, share of the services industry and a measure of urbanization. Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 14: Effect of Trust Act on Enforcement, Policing and Crime

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	local	federal	total	clearance viol	crime viol	clearance prop	crime prop
California × Post Trust	-0.309*** (0.066)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.067*** (0.012)	0.078*** (0.016)	13.308 (12.252)	0.030*** (0.007)	-7.289 (28.166)
Observations	14316	24276	24276	32476	36058	32906	36058
Adjusted R^2	0.342	0.432	0.362	0.341	0.912	0.441	0.848

Notes: The dependent variable is the clearance rate of violent crimes which is the ratio of clearances (arrests) over reported crimes. **California** is a dummy for counties in California. **Post Trust** is an indicator equal to one for months after the California Trust Act. In all the specifications, there are county and time fixed effects, a county specific linear time trend and federal district dummies interacted with time dummies. Regressions are weighted by 2010 population. Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


Table 15: Effect of Trust Act on Policing and Crime. Triple Difference.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	clearance violent	clearance violent	clearance property	clearance property	violent crimes	violent crimes	property crimes	property crimes
Non Citizen \times guidelines	-0.584* (0.344)	-0.491 (0.354)	-0.192* (0.115)	-0.119 (0.151)	-9.684 (10.210)	-13.684 (9.207)	-11.686 (11.403)	-15.547 (9.903)
Democrat \times guidelines	-0.076** (0.037)	-0.338 (0.242)	-0.045* (0.026)	0.209 (0.172)	-2.160 (1.793)	-8.235 (9.086)	-2.348 (1.909)	-11.781 (9.854)
Non Citizen \times Democrat \times guidelines	1.299** (0.599)	1.185* (0.625)	0.488*** (0.184)	0.399 (0.262)	10.846 (19.193)	16.126 (17.660)	14.024 (21.328)	19.168 (18.929)
Non Citizen \times Post Trust	-0.025 (0.086)	-0.004 (0.092)	0.167** (0.082)	0.189** (0.087)	-3.263 (3.616)	-4.420 (3.909)	-2.346 (3.893)	-3.467 (4.228)
Non Citizen \times California \times Post Trust	0.340*** (0.131)	0.296** (0.137)	-0.095 (0.093)	-0.122 (0.096)	9.602 (6.687)	10.035 (6.691)	9.338 (7.363)	9.671 (7.340)
Observations	64478	64478	65348	65348	71637	71637	71637	71637
Adjusted R^2	0.878	0.878	0.800	0.801	0.677	0.678	0.650	0.651

Notes: The dependent variable is the clearance rate of violent crimes which is the ratio of clearances (arrests) over reported crimes. **California** is a dummy for counties in California. **Post Trust** is an indicator equal to one for months after the California Trust Act. **Guidelines** is an indicator equal to one for months after the Obama guidelines. **Non Citizen** is the share of non citizen in a county measured with Census 2010 data. **Democrat** is the share of voters for the Democratic Party in the 2008 presidential election. In all the specifications, there are county and time fixed effects, a county specific linear time trend and federal district dummies interacted with time dummies. Regressions are weighted by 2010 population. In column (2) and (4) I include county-level controls interacted with the guidelines dummy. Those include share of population with a bachelor degree, share of the services industry and a measure of urbanization. Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


Figures

Figure 1: Non-Border Removals by Year




Source: ICE

Figure 2: Different Types of Enforcement by Quarter




Red line: Obama guidelines. Green line: Trust Act Average weighted by 2010 population of counties enrolled in Secure Communities before May 2010.

Figure 3: Clearance rate for violent crimes




Violent crimes: murder, manslaughter, rape, assault, robbery

Figure 4: Clearance rate for property crimes




Property crimes: larceny, burglary, motor vehicle theft

Figure 5: Clearance rate for violent crimes. Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation




Violent crimes: murder, manslaughter, rape, assault, robbery

Figure 6: Clearance rate for property crimes. Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation



Property crimes: larceny, burglary, motor vehicle theft

Figure 7: Event Studies Estimates for Clearance Rate of Violent Crimes



Notes: The graph shows coefficients (95% confidence intervals) on interactions between the non citizen share, democratic share and the Obama guidelines. The specification includes county fixed effects, district and state dummies interacted with time fixed effects. Interaction with one quarter before the policy is omitted to identify the model. Specification is weighted by 2010 county population. The vertical line is the the quarter right before the policy change, April-June 2011.